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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20050506
JOSEPH HOSKINS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Robbery, a seconddegree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 and one count of assault, a
class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN FAILING TO
ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE
CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE FOR THE REASONS
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
A CONVICTION?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by
the defense motion to dismiss at the end of the State's case. The appellate court must
determine as a matter of law and fact whether the evidence at trial supported the
Defendant's conviction.

"When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a

criminal jury trial, we begin with the threshold issue of statutory interpretation, which
1

we decide as a matter of law. With regard to the facts, 'we review the evidence and
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the verdict of the jury.'"

State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 355(Utah Ct. App.

1995)(quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1992)(citations omitted).
POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING TO ADMIT EXPERT TESTIMONY OF OFICER
TOLMAN REGARDING A FLASH TEST OF THE
DEFENDANT'S URINE?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was preserved for appeal when an
objection was made was made, argued, and ruled on by the trial court (R.133 / 320).
A trial court's decision to either grant or deny a continuance is clearly within its
discretion. Therefore, we will not disturb such decisions absent a clear abuse of
discretion. State v. Tolano, 19 P.3d 400, 414 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted)
See also State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
POINT III
DID THE PROSECUTOR COMMIT MISCONDUCT BY
TELLING THE JURY THAT THEY NEED NOT WORRY
ABOUT REASONABLE DOUBT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In determining whether a given statement
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of the
totality of the evidence presented at trial. See State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Because the issue was not raised with the trial court it should
be analyzed under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly
2

objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant. . ." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
POINT IV
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS
SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY
HIS ATTORNEY'S BLATANT FAILURES DURING AND
BEFORE TRIAL?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter
of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of
counsel.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the

United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was adopted in State
v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether counsel was ineffective.
The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article 1, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Article 1, Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases.

4

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal
property; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate
force against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful
appropriation.
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful
appropriation" if it occurs:
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation;
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
Section 76- 5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury
to another.

Section 77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice requirements.
(1)
(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in
a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the
hearing.
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(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and one of the following:
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony
sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to
meet the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult
with the opposing party on reasonable notice.
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee
charged by the expert for the consultation.
If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the
results of any tests or other specialized data, the party intending to call the
witness shall provide to the opposing party the information upon request.
As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the information
concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving notice shall
provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates
calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the information required
under Subsection (l)(b).
(a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to
prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result
of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose
appropriate sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony
will only apply if the court finds that a party deliberately violated the
provisions of this section.
(a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of
the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to
by the expert at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing
shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum
vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the
expert may be called as an expert witness.
This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of the
state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as a
witness at trial, and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult
with the opposing party upon reasonable notice.
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 17
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment,
or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense.
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged in an information dated November 9, 2004, with
the offenses of robbery, a second-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §766-301 and assault, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.
On November 9, 2004, the Defendant made an initial appearance and the information
was read. On December 20, 2004, the preliminary hearing was held; the matter was
bound over for trial. The jury trial was held on March 8, and 9, 2005 with the
Honorable Judge John Morris presiding.
After a two-day jury trial, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty to both
counts. On May 24, 2005, the Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in
the Utah State Prison of 1-15 years in prison together with one year on the
misdemeanor to run concurrently. The Defendant was transported to the Utah State
Prison to commence his prison term. The Defendant filed his notice of appeal on
May 31, 2005.
7

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The victim, who was staying at the Ogden River Inn on a long-term basis, had
been drinking the night of August 16th. He had consumed approximately 12 beers late
into the night and then was awaken by a knock on the door at 5:30 a.m. (R. 132/86)
A prostitute that he had utilized in the past1, known to him by the name of Brown
Sugar was at his door, and he let her in to use the phone. (R. 132/88) She asked him
if he "wanted to have fun" (meaning did he want to pay for sexual services) which he
declined. He gave her $10 or $20 for bus fare and she left. (R. 132/137)
Approximately 30-45 minutes later she came back to his room accompanied by two
black males, whom the victim could not identify. (R. 132/92) As he was sitting on the
chair, one of the individuals hit him on the side of the head and knocked him into the
heating register. (R. 132/95) The two male individuals then pulled down his pants
and took his wallet, which contained money and credit cards. (R. 132/95) All three
assailants then left the room, taking both the cell phone and the motel phone. The
victim called the police from a neighboring room. The police arrived, gathered
minimal evidence and examined the victim. Although the victim had some cuts on
his ear, and was bleeding, he refused to go to the hospital for medical attention. (R.
132/68) Later, he decided to go to the hospital for an examination which resulted in
a diagnosis of a laceration to his ear that required more than 40 stitches to close. (R.
132/99) At trial, the victim reiterated the fact that he couldn't identify either of the
two male assailants. (R 132/96)
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Terranosha Jackman testified that she has always gone by the name of
Chocolate. She never remembered using the name Brown Sugar. (R. 133/201) She
testified that she had pled guilty to the robbery in this case and was awaiting
sentencing. (R. 132/139) On August 17, 2004, she was addicted to crack cocaine,
and was using cocaine on a frequent basis. (R. 132 /143) She claimed that she had
gone to the victim's room the night before, at 7:00 p.m. and had eaten pizza with the
victim. (R. 133/179) She returned at 3:00 a.m.2 and she claimed that the victim had
paid her $20 to perform a sexual act. (R. 133/181) She was going to leave and come
back to perform the act, but never upheld her end of the bargain. (R. 132/144, 146)
When she went to the victim's room at 3:00 a.m., according to her account, she was
accompanied by a co-defendant Ellis Ringwood. Mr. Ringwood stayed outside while
she went into the victim's room to use the phone. (R. 132/148)

Later in her

testimony Ms. Jackman testified that she went into the victim's room to call Ellis.
Upon questioning her on that discrepancy she simply ignored it and went on with her
testimony. (R. 133/180) She then claimed that she went to a party by the Marshall
White center with Ellis and told him that they could get some money from a "trick"
(the victim). (R. 132/151) She returned to the victims room early the next morning
accompanied by Ellis and the Defendant while she was high on crack-cocaine. She
was so high on cocaine that her memory was hazy. (R. 132/145, 152, 188) She
testified that the Defendant hit the victim and then he and Ellis took the money. (R.
1

There is a dispute as to what that act entailed, the victim claimed at first he did not ever hire her for her
services, but later admitted to paying for oral sex. Ms. Jackman testified that he paid for and received
intercourse. (R. 133/133, 178)
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132/161) On cross-examination she admitted that she did not see the victim get hit.
(R. 133/194) According to Ms. Jackman the group then left the motel and went to a
Maverick store and divided up the money with each receiving $60. (R. 164, 224)
Ms. Jackman admitted that she was testifying to fulfill her end of a plea
bargain that reduced her charges from Aggravated Robbery to Robbery. (R. 133/176)
Ms. Jackman has given several versions of this incident, including one to Det.
Draper, one to Det. Melcher, and one at trial. (R. 133/203-208) She admitted that
when she was on cocaine her memory would be affected, and that it was the worst
when she had been using and awake for a long time. She admitted that she had been
up for at least 24 hours at the time of this incident. (R. 133 /226)
Ellis Ringwood testified that he had been up for several days getting high on
crack cocaine on the 17th of August 2004. (R. 133/240) At some time in the morning
(although he couldn't remember when) of August 17, 2004, Ms. Jackman called him
on his cell phone.(R. 133/241) His testimony conflicts with that of Ms. Jackman's in
that he testified that when she called him he was at a house on Childs street getting
high with six other people, rather than in his car outside the Ogden River Inn. (R.
133/242) He testified that Ms. Jackman is a liar, and that "she's known to lie about
everything basically,"(sic) and that she "will lie to get what she wants, to gain."
(sic)(R. 133/278, 290) He testified that she lied by saying that a John owed her some
money, and she wanted a couple of guys to go with her to intimidate the guy. (R.
133/247) He stated that they went to the motel room with Ms. Jackman and the
2

There is a conflict in Ms. Jackman's testimony on this accord, she also testified that he gave her the $20 the
night before, at approximately 7:00 p.m. (R. 132/144)
10

Defendant and that the two guys stood off to the side while Ms. Jackman got the
victim to open the door. They all then went into the room. (R. 133/251) When he
saw the victim, he recognized him as someone who gets high. This was another
contradiction to the testimony of Ms. Jackman and the victim. (R. 133/254) His
testimony then diverges from that of the prior two in that he said that the Defendant
hit the victim several times and pulled the chair out from under him. (R. 133/256) He
then contradicts the testimony of Ms. Jackman in claiming that they drove straight to
the house on Child's and did not stop at the Maverick. He disputed that they ever
went to the Maverick store. (R. 133/260, 261) He claimed that they each got about
$120 - $140, again in contradiction of both Ms. Jackman and the victim who testified
to $60 each or $200 total respectively. (R. 133/261, 224, 65) Mr. Ringwood also
admitted that he received a plea bargain in exchange for his testimony. (R. 133/266)
He testified that he earlier had lied to the police to "make it go in my favor". (R.
133/285) He admitted lying at the preliminary hearing (R. 133/292)
The prosecution then rested and the Defendant moved for a directed verdict of
acquittal. The court, without allowing any argument, denied the motion. (R. 133/292)
Danielle Peterson, the Defendant's former girlfriend, then testified that she was with
the Defendant on the night in question. (R. 133/295) She recalled the Defendant
being in her home that night and helping her get their child to sleep. They went to
bed together at about midnight; and she awoke two to three times during the night to
care for their child, each time noticing that the Defendant was in the bed asleep. (R.
133/296)

On cross-examination the prosecutor elicited testimony about the
11

Defendant's prison stay, and then began directly asking questions about the
Defendant being on parole. The defense objected, which objection was apparently
overruled at a sidebar conference since the prosecutor was allowed to continue the
questioning concerning the parole officer. (R. 133/307)
The prosecution then called the Defendant's parole officer as a witness over
the objection of the Defendant. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed
the parole officer to testify. He testified that on August 17, 2004, the Defendant went
into his office and gave a urine sample. The Defendant again objected to this
testimony, which was overruled by the trial court. (R. 133/319)

The parole officer

was asked to give the result of the test, to which the defense again objected. This
objection was again overruled by the trial court without allowing argument. (R.
133/320) The defense then moved that the entire testimony of the parole officer be
stricken, which objection was again overruled. (R. 133/322)
In closing argument the prosecutor stated:
Beyond a shadow of a doubt is not the test that you're required to
apply. Your test is reason. You use reason. You're the reasonable
man that we talked about. You're the reasonable person that's been
brought here to consider this case, and you don't need to look for
doubt. You don't need to search for doubt. If doubt doesn't exist,
then don't find it and find the defendant guilty. You don't have to go
in worrying about reasonable doubt. (R. 133/336)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant raises three issues in the appeal. Defendant's first claim of
error, which, if granted would result in reversal, was the failure of the trial court to
grant a motion to dismiss at the end of the State's case. The evidence tying the
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Defendant to the crime hinged entirely on the tenuous testimony of two crack cocaine
addicts whose testimony was contradictory on several major points. The victim of the
case could not identify the Defendant as his assailant, and therefore was of no value
on this issue. Both crack addicts testified that the Defendant was at the scene and was
the one who hit the victim. Both admitted to lying to the police on several occasions
and both acknowledged lying at the preliminary hearing under oath in the case at bar.
They both admitted to being high on crack cocaine at the time of the incident and to
having been up on a several day drug binge immediately prior to the incident. Their
stories conflicted on where they met the evening of the incident, how they met on the
evening of the incident, and what occurred at the scene as well as during the getaway.
Ms. Jackman, (a co-defendant who had entered a plea bargain on the case in
exchange for her testimony against the Defendant) additionally had numerous
internal inconsistencies in her testimony. Mr. Ringwood, (the other co-defendant
who also had entered a plea bargain in exchange for his testimony against the
Defendant) testified that Ms. Jackman was a known liar and that she lies about
"everything basically".

Mr. Ringwood also admitted that he himself lied to the

police and to the court at a preliminary hearing "to make it go in my favor."
The second error committed by the trial court was allowing into evidence
testimony of a parole officer regarding the test results of a urine sample taken from
the Defendant on the day of the crime. This testimony is problematic in two respects.
First, this testimony constitutes expert testimony, given without prior notice and
given without any foundation as to the training or expertise of the witness. Second,
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the testimony is improper character evidence of a non-testifying Defendant. The
results of this testimony were prejudicial and extremely harmful.
The final issue on appeal is the improper definition of reasonable doubt given
by the prosecutor in closing argument. In his closing he stated, "You're the
reasonable person that's been brought here to consider this case and you don't need
to look for doubt. You don't need to search for doubt. If doubt doesn't exist, then
don't find it and find the Defendant guilty. You don't have to go in worrying about
reasonable doubt." (R. 133/336) This statement is not only an incorrect statement of
law, but the fact that both defense counsel and the trial court allowed it to be spoken
to the jury gave the impression that they did not need to "worry[] about reasonable
doubt."
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO
ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF AQUITTAL AT THE
CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE FOR REASONS
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
A CONVICTION.
In the case of State v. Silva 13 P.3d 604 (Utah App. Ct. 2000) the court stated,
"[T]his court's power to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient
evidence is limited." (Citations omitted) The Utah Supreme Court has said, "So
long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings
of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops."
State v. Mead 21 P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted). Additionally, in
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, "Ordinarily, a
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reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must
resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict."
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court may
overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Court reversed a
conviction of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally
valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, expert or
otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for purposes of
sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the defendant's guilty
verdict.
Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) the Court
reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second degree murder case where the
evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case there was undisputed evidence that
the victim had been murdered. The sole evidence against the defendant consisted of
the fact that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim, and the fact that
he had related a dream to three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and
that he "thought he hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." (Id at 446) In that
case the Court stated:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as
it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a speculative
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leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence,
stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 2002)
the Court, again recognizing the significant standard of review required to reverse a
conviction in an insufficient evidence appeal, reversed the trial court's conviction of
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined that a
second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. No other
evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was found, but
rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had the motive and
opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that conviction, the Court
held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the
defendant's] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the evidence
supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the opportunity
to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed it ever existed.

While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence in
support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an extensive
marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. The seminal problem
in the case is that the only testimony that ties the Defendant to the crime was the
testimony of two crack-cocaine addicts that had been high on cocaine for several
days prior to the crime. The testimony is undisputed that the victim of the crime
could not identify the Defendant as one of the assailants. The testimony is also
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undisputed that the Defendant never admitted to anyone that he was in any way
involved in the crime. Furthermore, he had an alibi witness with significant
credibility, since she was a former girlfriend with whom he had had an admittedly
acrimonious separation.
In examining the testimony of the two crack cocaine addicts, it must be
acknowledged that they both testified that the Defendant was at the scene of the
crime and that he was the person who actually struck the victim. They both stated
that the Defendant was picked up at a house on Child's street and that he rode in a car
owned by a person named Brenda. Their story is also consistent with regards to the
occurrences inside the motel room. They both said that the two males waited outside
while Ms. Jackman knocked on the door and gained entry under the assumption that
she was alone. They both said that the two males then entered the room, and while
she was rummaging through the victims clothes the Defendant hit the victim and
knocked him to the floor. Ms. Jackman did not see the actual assault but turned
around after the victim had hit the floor. At this point her testimony diverges from
that of Mr. Ringwood. He claimed that the Defendant hit the victim several times (a
fact disputed by the victim himself) and that the Defendant pulled the chair out from
under the victim. Both Ms. Jackman and the victim would dispute this claim. The
victim said that he was hit once and fell to the floor striking his head on the heat
register. Ms. Jackman's story was that she turned when she heard the hit and saw the
victim on the floor. She did not say the chair was moved in any way.
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The trial testimony of Mr. Ringwood was consistent with that of Ms. Jackman
claiming that Mr. Ringwood took the victim's wallet. However, it must be noted that
his testimony is in direct contradiction with his prior testimony at the preliminary
hearing where he said the Defendant took the wallet from the victim.
The remainder of the two crack-addict's testimonies is widely divergent
concerning the occurrences before the incident and after the incident. They are also in
direct contrast to the Defendant's witness Danielle Peterson and to the testimony of
the victim himself.
Ms. Jackman testified that she had gone to the victim's apartment the night
before at around 7:00 p.m. and that they had eaten pizza together. (R. 133/179)
Around 3:00 a.m. she returned to his room and they talked about her performing a
sexual act for money. The victim then gave her $20, and she left promising to return
and perform the act later. R. 133 /181) This was in direct contradiction of the
victim's testimony who stated that she had come to his room around 5:30 a.m. and
asked to use the phone. While there she inquired if he would like to hire her for a
sexual act, which the victim declined. He then gave her $20 for bus fare and she left.
Ms. Jackman testified that before leaving the room she made a call to Mr.
Ringwood. At this point even her own testimony became internally confusing
because she claimed that Mr. Ringwood had given her a ride to the motel room and
was waiting outside, and yet she claimed she went into the room to call Mr.
Ringwood. When queried on this problem she simply went on to other testimony
with no explanation. Mr. Ringwood contradicted this testimony saying she had
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arrived at the home on Childs immediately before they discussed and then went to the
motel room to commit the crime. He never claimed to have gone to the motel room
earlier in the morning.
The events that occurred immediately after the crime were also differently
described.

Ms. Jackman claimed that the three left the motel room, with the

Defendant having blood on his shoes. Mr. Ringwood stated that he never saw blood
on the Defendant. He claimed that as they drove back to the house on Childs street
that he divided up the money with each getting approximately $120-$ 140. Ms.
Jackman said that they drove to a Maverick store and there divided up the money
equally with each getting about $60. The victim claimed that $200 was stolen, which
would be closer to the amount claimed by Ms. Jackman. Mr. Ringwood denied on
several occasions ever going to a Maverick store, saying that the Maverick was past
the Childs residence.
Finally, both of the State's witnesses contradict the testimony of Danielle
Peterson who testified, despite having been separated from the Defendant, that he had
been at her home the evening and morning in question.
The Defendant recognizes that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in
a jury verdict, the standard of review is narrow. See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342,
345 (Utah 1985).
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. We
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
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doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. State
v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987). As long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, "from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime
can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." (State v. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.)
In the present case the reasonable inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant committed the crime". Given the fact that the witnesses5 statements on
core fact are so contradictory, the reliability of the jury's verdict in this case must be
called into question. This is even more true where the jury was improperly influenced
by improper evidence regarding a urine sample taken from the Defendant. These
problems shake the very foundation of the jury verdict in the case at bar.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RULING TO ADMIT EXPERT TESTIMONY OF
OFFICER TOLMAN REGARDING A FLASH TEST OF THE
DEFENDANT'S URINE.
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that before any expert witness
in a criminal trial can testify the offering party must give at least 3 0-days notice to
the opposing party. Furthermore, any expertise of a witness must be adequately
established by proper foundational evidence. In the case at bar, neither requirement
was met.
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UCA §77-17-13 provides in relevant part:
(1) (a) if the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a
felony case at trial or any hearing ... the party intending to call the expert
shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less
than 30 days before trial.
The notice intended in this section includes information concerning the
expert's name, address, curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report if one
exists. The purpose for this section is to allow opposing counsel to be notified of the
expert witness, and to give opposing counsel an opportunity to contact that witness
and determine exactly what the witness intends to testify about, and an opportunity
for opposing counsel to prepare for the examination and possibly retain a witness in
rebuttal
UCA §77-17-13(4)(a) provides the Defendant a remedy in the event of a
violation of this requirement by the prosecution. That subsection provides:
If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary
to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial
or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
The Utah appellate courts have routinely held that compliance with UCA §7717-13 is mandatory. In the case of State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App.
1997) the court established a four-prong test to be used in reviewing a trial court's
denial of a motion for continuance due to a §77-17-13 violation. That test is set forth
as follows:
In reviewing the denial of appellant's request for continuance or other
relief, we consider four factors: (1) the extent of appellant's diligence
in his efforts to ready his defense prior to the date set for trial; (2) the
likelihood that the need for a continuance could have been met if the
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continuance had been granted; (3) the extent to which granting the
continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the opposing
party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant might have suffered
harm as a result of the court's denial. (Citations omitted)
In that case, the Court was presented with a factual situation in which the
prosecution, during the first day of trial delivered some clothing to the State crime
lab for analysis. On the afternoon of the first day of trial, the prosecution presented
to the defense counsel with a report that the analysis resulted in a finding of human
blood on the clothing. The Defendant then moved for the exclusion of the evidence,
or for a continuance of the trial. The trial court denied both motions. During the in
limine motion hearing, the prosecutor tried to argue that the proposed expert
testimony was not prejudicial. The Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, making
the following observation of the trial court exchange in that hearing:
The prosecutor stated: "[W]hether or not there is blood on the panties is
not a pivotal issue in this case, your honor." In response, the trial judge
correctly observed, with our emphasis, as follows:
Well, let me just tell you, as a prefatory matter / consider that
testimony critical It's one thing to have lay people say it looks like
blood. It's quite another thing to have the laboratory say it is in fact
blood. For a couple of reasons. One, it's objective. And number two, its
impact upon jurors is substantially different than having the mother of
the child say it looked like blood. (Id. at 531)
Based upon an analysis under the four-prong test, this Court reversed the
Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
In the case of State v. Tolano, 19 P.3d 400 (Utah App. 2001), which is
remarkably similar to the case at bar, the Court was presented with a case wherein the
prosecution called two criminologists to testify that the substance presented into
evidence was in fact cocaine. The prosecution had failed to provide the requisite
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notice to defense, and the Defendant objected to the testimony, moved that the
testimony be stricken, and requested a continuance.

The trial court denied the

continuance and this Court held:
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
[defendant's] motion for continuance. First, [the defendant] exercised
appropriate diligence in his efforts to ready his defense prior to the date
set for trial... Second, it is likely that [the defendant] could have been
more adequately prepared to meet the expert testimony at trial if the
court had granted the continuance... Third, [the defendant's] right to
the fair trial outweighed any inconvenience to the court, the opposing
party, and the jury that may have been caused by a continuance... (Id.
at 403)
Furthermore, the Court noted that according to the case of State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d
1167 (Utah App. 1998), the burden of establishing prejudice, is shifted to the State.
The court, quoting the Arellano decision, held, "therefore to establish the
prosecution's error was not prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that there is
no reasonable likelihood that absent the prosecutor's error, the outcome would have
been more favorable for the defendant". (Id at 404)
In the case of State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167 (Utah App. 1998), the Utah
Court of Appeals reiterated the four-prong criteria set forth above in reviewing expert
witness testimony. In that case, the court was presented with a situation wherein the
State utilized the testimony of the State Crime Lab chemist to testify regarding the
identity of a controlled substance (cocaine). The State had utilized this expert during
the preliminary hearing, and then five days prior to trial notified the Defendant that it
intended to use that expert at trial. The trial court denied the Defendant's motion to
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exclude the testimony3, as well as the defense motion for continuance. The court
concluded that there was uncontroverted testimony that the Defendant had not been
given the proper 30-day notice of the proposed expert testimony, and therefore he
was entitled to a continuance. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
denial of the Defendant's motion for continuance, and remanded the case for new
trial.
In State v. Tolano infra, the Court conducted a detailed analysis of the fourprong test set forth above. That analysis may be useful in examining the present case,
and is therefore reviewed here. Under the first prong, the Court found that
First, Tolano exercised appropriate diligence in his efforts to ready his
defense prior to the date set for trial. For example, Tolano interviewed
witnesses and made arrangements to have witnesses, including his
stepson from Mexico, testify on his behalf. In addition, Tolano
extensively cross-examined most of the State's witnesses, Tolano made
a chart outlining the area where the alleged offense occurred, and
Tolano arranged for an interpreter when necessary. Finally, although
Tolano was aware that the criminologists prepared the toxicology
report, "it is not defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all
potential, yet undisclosed expert witnesses. . . . " Consequently,
"defense counsel appears to have been fully prepared to present
defendant's case." (Id at 403 citations omitted)
Under the second prong, the court found:
Second, it is likely that Tolano could have been more adequately
prepared to meet the expert testimony if the trial court had granted the
continuance. Specifically, a continuance would have provided Tolano
with an opportunity to examine the testing procedures used by the
experts and compare them with other testing methods, hire his own
expert to challenge the testing procedures, and examine the resumes of
the experts and possibly impugn their qualifications. Therefore, "[a]
3

State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah App. 1998), "Here, the trial court did not find that the State
acted in bad faith. Therefore, as to defendant's argument that McNair's (State Crime Lab chemist) expert
testimony should have been excluded, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion to exclude McNair's testimony."
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continuance would have both provided defendant more time to prepare
to challenge [the experts'] testimony . . . and then incorporate any new
information into the defense strategy." (Id at 403 citations omitted)
The third test, determining whether the inconvenience to the court, opposing
party and the jury is outweighed by the Defendants right to a fair trial, the Court
noted that "this court has specifically held that such an administrative concern is
outweighed by the appellant's right to a fair trial" (Id. at 404 citations omitted)
The fourth factor, the harm the Defendant suffered as a result of the court's
denial for a motion to continue, is to some extent presumed by this Court. In State v.
Tolano, infra, the court held:
The final factor — the extent to which Tolano might have suffered
harm as a result of the court's denial — is the "'most important among
the factors.'" In Arellano, we recognized the difficult burden placed on
defendants to establish prejudice in cases such as these, and we shifted
the burden of proving prejudice from the defendant to the State. See id.
"Therefore, to establish that the prosecution's error was not prejudicial,
the State must persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood
that, absent the prosecution's error, the outcome would have been more
favorable for defendant." (Id. at 404 citations omitted)
In the case at bar, there is no question that all four prongs of the requisite test
had clearly been met.

Under the first test, whether or not defense counsel had

adequately prepared for trial, all indication from reading the transcript of the trial
would indicate that is in fact the case. Defense counsel immediately objected to the
proposed evidence.

Defense counsel did extensive cross-examination of various

witnesses. There is no indication the defense counsel was unprepared for trial. It is
important to note in the present case that the evidence was presented in the State's
rebuttal portion of the trial, and therefore was a surprise to the Defendant.
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Furthermore, "it is not defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all potential, yet
undisclosed expert witnesses'^ State v. Tolano at 403)
Considering the second prong, "It is likely that [the defendant] could been
more adequately prepared to meet the expert testimony of the trial court had granted
the continuance." Furthermore, a continuance would have allowed defense counsel
"an opportunity to examine the testing procedures used by the experts and compare
them with other testing methods, hire his own expert to challenge the testing
procedures, and examine the resumes of the experts and possibly impugn their
qualifications." (Id at 403 citations omitted)
The third issue, with regards to inconvenience to the trial court, opposing
counsel, or the jury, there is no question that the Defendant's right to a fair trial
clearly outweighs administrative concerns. Furthermore, since it is the State that
failed to provide notice as required under §77-17-13, it would be disingenuous for the
state to thereafter argue that it has been inconvenience by the Defendant's timely
objection.
The final prong, harm to the Defendant, has clearly been established. Just as
in all of the cases cited above, the expert testimony regarding the presence of three
drugs in the Defendant's system was clearly prejudicial to the Defendant.
The State may argue that the testimony of the parole officer simply constitutes
lay testimony belies the fact that the witness testified about a scientific procedure in
establishing that the Defendant's urine contained three controlled substances. In State
v. Begishe infra, the trial court recognized this fact in stating,
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Well, let me just tell you, as a prefatory matter / consider that testimony
critical. It's one thing to have lay people say it looks like blood. It's
quite another thing to have the laboratory say it is in fact blood. For a
couple of reasons. One, it's objective. And number two, its impact upon
jurors is substantially different than having the mother of the child say
it looked like blood. (Id. at 531)
The fourth, and final prong of the §77-17-13 test is the burden of establishing
the lack of harm to the Defendant. As mentioned above, this has been placed on the
prosecution, and it is the Defendant's position that the prosecution cannot meet that
burden. There is no question that if the jury had not heard the evidence regarding the
controlled substances in the Defendant's system, the overall weakness of the States
case would have collapsed. The State's reliance on the fact that the Defendant was as
doped up as their other witnesses establishes that the Defendant was clearly
prejudiced by the §77-17-13 violation.
POINT III
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITED MISCONDUCT BY
TELLING THE JURY THAT THEY NEED NOT WORRY
ABOUT REASONABLE DOUBT.
During the prosecutor's closing statement he proclaimed that the law
regarding reasonable doubt was as follows:
Beyond a shadow of a doubt is not the test that you're required to
apply. Your test is reason. You use reason. You're the reasonable
man that we talked about. You're the reasonable person that's been
brought here to consider this case and you don't need to look for
doubt. You don't need to search for doubt. If doubt doesn't exist,
then don't find it and find the defendant guilty. You don't have to
go in worrying about reasonable doubt. (R. 133/336 emphasis added)
This statement, which was obviously improper, went to the jury without any
objection by defense counsel and without any comment or curative instruction by the
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trial court. These statements amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because "the
remarks call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining their verdict. . ." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
1239, 1261 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, these comments were extremely prejudicial.
The 5th and 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as
Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah guarantees that all criminal
defendants shall be guaranteed due process of law, which is the embodiment of a fair
trial. The Supreme Court in the case of Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950)
held:
"It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process Clause
embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history.
Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is
fair and right and just."4
Further, the Court has observed that "[d]ue process is violated if a practice or
rule 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934).
One of the basics of this principle of justice is that the prosecutor in a criminal
case is held to a higher standard than a mere advocate. The prosecutor has taken an
oath to uphold justice and to shun any actions that could jeopardize fairness.
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) held:

28

trial court. These statements amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because "the
remarks calljed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining their verdict. . ." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
1239, 1261 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, these comments were extremely prejudicial.
The 5th and 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as
Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah guarantees that all criminal
defendants shall be guaranteed due process of law, which is the embodiment of a fair
trial. The Supreme Court in the case of Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950)
held:
"It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process Clause
embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history.
Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is
fair and right and just."4
Further, the Court has observed that "[d]ue process is violated if a practice or
rule 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '"Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934).
One of the basics of this principle of justice is that the prosecutor in a criminal
case is held to a higher standard than a mere advocate. Tht prosecutor has taken an
oath to uphold justice and to shun any actions that could jeopardize fairness.
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)) held:

28

"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one."
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has likewise observed the special position a
prosecutor holds when it stated:
"Once again we observe that prosecutors have duties that rise above
those of privately employed attorneys. As former Chief Justice Gordon
Hall, himself a prosecutor prior to assuming the bench, observed in
Emmett, (supra) '[P]rosecutors have a duty to eschew all improper
tactics.5" State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 961(Utah 1999)
Prosecutorial misconduct can occur in various manners and can take a variety
of forms. The Court, in the case of State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, held, "We will
reverse a jury verdict because of prosecutorial misconduct if we find the prosecutor's
remarks were improper and harmful to defendant."

In a long line of cases the

Appellate Courts of the State of Utah have closely examined prosecutors' actions in
criminal trials, and reversed those convictions, which were tainted by prosecutorial
misconduct. A review of some of those cases follows.
In State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 1999) the court reversed a conviction
of sexual abuse of a child where there were several errors including prosecutorial
misconduct.
4

The Court was particularity careful in examining prosecutorial

Dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter
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misconduct in cases where proof of guilt is not strong. "Once again we observe that
prosecutors have duties that rise above those of privately employed attorneys." {Id.
961)
In the case of State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993) the Court examined
questions and statements of the prosecutor and found obvious error. The Court noted,
"The insinuation that other evidence exists encourages the jury to determine its
verdict based upon evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a Defendant's right to
a trial based upon the evidence presented. The prosecutor's remarks and his questions
asked of Detective Couch constituted obvious error." {Id at 349) Although the Court
found prosecutorial misconduct to be error, they deemed the error harmless due to the
overwhelming admissible evidence produced elsewhere in the trial. "When there is
strong proof of guilt, the conduct or remark of a prosecutor is not presumed
prejudicial. Therefore, unless the error undermines our confidence in the jury verdict,
we will not overturn that verdict." {Id at 349)
In State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) the court found plain error in a
prosecutions comments in closing argument. In commenting on Emmett's forgery
conviction, the prosecutor noted that the victim of the crime was Emmett's sister.
Stating that Emmett is "[s]omeone who took advantage of his own family member,"
the prosecutor declared, "Well, he did it again." {Id at 786) In that case the court
found that the evidence of guilt in the remainder of the trial was not strong, and
therefore reversed the conviction of sodomy of a child.
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The Supreme Court likewise found prosecutorial misconduct in the case of
State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986). In that case the prosecutor asked
Defendant in cross examination about additional felonies (the Defendant had
admitted to three felony convictions on direct examination) inferring he had others.
The Defendant denied other convictions and the prosecutor never offered any
evidence of other convictions. The court however affirmed the conviction ruling that
"[I]n view of the evidence adduced and the instructions given, and the fact that
Defendant did admit to three prior convictions for burglary, we cannot say that there
is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been any different
in the absence of the prosecutor's misconduct." (Id at 770)
In one of the most cited cases regarding prosecutorial misconduct, the Court
reversed the conviction of the defendant in the case of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483
(Utah 1984). In that case, the court found prosecutorial misconduct where the
prosecutor referred to the defendant's legal name change as an alias, where the
prosecutor claimed the defendant was under a federal witness identity program, and
also inferred that the defendant was involved in various criminal matters. In closing
statement, the prosecutor compared the defendant to Hinkley and asked the jury
"[U]se your experience, and in talking to one another, don't put your common sense
aside. If you have been involved in a situation, speak up, talk about it, deliberate it."
(Id. at 486) The court found prosecutorial misconduct in holding :
In this case, there was not compelling proof of defendant's guilt.
The jury could have found either way. Consequently, we are compelled
to find that the second step of the Valdez test has been met. The jurors
"probably were influenced by" the remarks of the prosecutor. While the
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trial court properly attempted to correct the errors, the potential for
harm, the probability for harm, and the continued efforts of the
prosecutor were too flagrant to be corrected. (Id. at 487)
In the case of State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court found that the prosecutors reference to the defendant's receiving income while
on social security as "double dipping" and "a cancer on society", signing paychecks
as "forging of signatures" and "filing for bankruptcy as an indication of dishonesty"
constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The court held, "[u]nder the circumstances of
this case, there is no doubt that the prosecutor's 'remarks called to the jurors'
attention matters which they would not be justified in considering . . . [and that they]
were probably influenced by the remarks.'" (Id. at 51) The Court found that the
prosecutor's conduct was improper, and would have constituted grounds for a new
trial if they had not reversed the convictions for insufficiency of the evidence.
In State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981) the Court reversed the
conviction of aggravated robbery on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. In that
case the defense objected several times to references to the defendant's post Miranda
silence, both during examination of witnesses as well as closing. The Court held;
"Even if it could be validly argued that defendant's objection and the
court's attempt to cure the matter by striking and admonition were
effective, this cannot be said about prosecutor's comments during his
final argument. The continued attempts by the prosecutor to put the
defendant's silence before the jury after his having been advised of his
right to remain silent amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. The
references to defendant's silence are fundamental error, which could
have affected the result and are therefore prejudicial." (Id. at 147)
In the case of Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981), the Court was
presented with a case in which the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence from
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the defense and during trial questioned witnesses and commented in closing about
things he knew were incorrect. The court found prosecutorial misconduct and
reversed the conviction. There was no objection since this evidence was discovered
by the defense after trial.
Finally, in the case of State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (1973), the Utah Supreme
Court established a test for determining prosecutorial misconduct. "The test of
whether the remarks made by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a
criminal case is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they
would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and were they,
under the circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by those
remarks." Id. at 426.
In the case at bar, the first part of the test is met. "[D]id the remarks call to the
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict. . ." Id.
The Defendant does not need to show bad faith on the part of the prosecutor
to show prosecutorial misconduct. "In Troy, we did not suggest that bad faith need
be shown. All that is necessary, according to Troy, is that cthe remarks call to the
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict and that the remarks rise to the level of prejudicial error."
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1261 (Utah 1988)(quoting State v. Troy, 688 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah 1984)).
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In the present case there is no question that the prosecutor called to the
"attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict."

The prosecutor made a statement that is in clear

contradiction to constitutional provisions, statutory law and extensive case law. The
very bedrock of criminal prosecutions is the principle that a criminal defendant is
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is, (and
was in this case) defined in a jury instruction in every criminal case.

The

prosecutor's statement in the case at bar was simply incorrect.
When deciding whether the second part of the test is met an appellate court
should consider all of the evidence concerning a defendant's guilt. See, State v. Troy,
688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) ("Step two is more difficult and involves a
consideration of the circumstances of the case as a whole.

In making such a

consideration, it is appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt.").
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged
conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial. Likewise, in a
case with less compelling proof, this court will more closely
scrutinize the conduct." Id. (citations omitted).
In the present case the evidence that the Defendant committed this offense is
weak. As set forth in Point I above, the only evidence that tied the Defendant to the
crime was the highly contradictory testimony of two crack cocaine addicts, both of
whom were admitted liars. There is no physical evidence that puts the Defendant at
the scene. There is no confession or other eyewitness testimony that identifies the
Defendant as the perpetrator.
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Although the Defendant's attorney didn't object to the evidence it was clearly
plain error for this evidence to be admitted. "To establish plain error, a defendant
must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to
the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See
also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) In the case of State v.
Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) this Court held, "Under [the plain
error] standard, we will not reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and
that the error was both obvious and harmful". The Court further ruled, "An error is
harmful if the likelihood of a different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine
confidence in the verdict.'" (Id at 1010)
The first prong of the plain error test is showing that an error occurred. In this
case, that prong is relatively obvious. In closing statement the prosecutor made
statement to the jury that they need not worry about reasonable doubt. This
proclamation is in contradiction to established case law, as well as statutory and
constitutional requirements. This Court has defined and redefined the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt on numerous occasions. In the recent case of
State v. Cruz, WL1705752 f 11-20, (Utah 2005) the Court reviewed and upheld
several jury instructions concerning reasonable doubt, all of which instructed the jury
to carefully examine doubt and then to determine if that doubt was reasonable.
In the case of State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305, p 7 (Utah 2005) the Utah Supreme
Court gave specific instructions regarding the language preferred injury instructions
concerning reasonable doubt. In that case the Court held:
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The [State] has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil
cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact
is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the [State's] proof
must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this
world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the
law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If,
based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him
guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he
is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him
not guilty. (Id. at f37„ emphasis added)
In the case at bar, the trial court itself gave an instruction that was at variance
to the prosecutors claim. The problem with the occurrences in the case at bar is that
neither defense counsel nor the trial court corrected the prosecutor, thus giving the
impression to the non-law trained jury that they "don't have to go [into the jury
deliberations] worrying about reasonable doubt." This is exactly opposite of what
they should be doing in their deliberations. The jury must consider, worry about and
ultimately dismiss any doubt that they don't find to be reasonable before they can
convict a criminal defendant. The jury in this case did none of the above.
The second prong of the plain error standard is that the error was both obvious
and harmful. The obviousness issue was addressed above and cannot be any clearer.
The prosecutor clearly made an incorrect statement of law.
The fact that the error was harmful is to some extent established by the finding
of guilt of the Defendant on both counts charged in a case where the evidence of guilt
was not strong. In the present case, the jury was presented with testimony of two
witnesses who were high on crack cocaine and both admitted liars. They both
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acknowledged that their own criminal cases were plea bargained based on their
testimony against the Defendant. The Defendant was convicted solely on the
contradictory stories of these two witnesses. The reasonable doubt is fully addressed
in Point I above, and will not be repeated here at risk of needless repetition.
POINT IV
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS
SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY
HIS ATTORNEY'S BLATANT FAILURES DURING
AND
BEFORE TRIAL.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was ineffective.
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.

This

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave some
guidance in noting; "The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 688) Although the Court
in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", (Id. at 688) it did mention
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certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to
avoid conflicts of interest" as well as a duty "to consult with the defendant on
important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments
in the course of the prosecution." (Id. at 688) Additionally, the overreaching
requirement by the Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is that
the "performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances." (Id. at 688)
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsel's
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above.
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, Ml U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91
L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) the Court was presented with a case where defense counsel, due
to a failure to conduct proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress
evidence under the 4th amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction
under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that
reversal. In that affirmation of reversal the Court stated:
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant
must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and
that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been
different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual
prejudice. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91
L.Ed.2d 305 (1986))
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to comport with
constitutional requirements the Court held:
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In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally creditable
enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent and pervasive
failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." [citation
omitted] Under these circumstances, although the failure of the District
Court and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall
performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional assistance
in the respects alleged. (Kimmelman v. Morrrison, Ml U.S. 365, 386
(1986))
In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d
471, (U.S. 2003) the U.S. Supreme Court found that counsel's failure to investigate
the extensive abuse the defendant had suffered through his life was unreasonable.
The Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that this failure resulted in defense
counsels inability to present this evidence to the sentencing jury in a capital case. The
Court stated:
We further find that had the jury been confronted with this considerable
mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have
returned with a different sentence. (Wiggins v. Smith at Point III)
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have likewise
rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can guide a
determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties.
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) the Court
held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a 4th Amendment violation
constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. In that case, the Court
applied the Strickland test to a situation where defense counsel had in a pretrial
39

motion moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The trial court
denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. During trial the
officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of plain view, yet trial counsel did
not re-raise the motion to suppress. The Court held that "where a defendant can show
that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions,
the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860
P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
In the case of State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), the Utah
Court of Appeals reversed a defendant's conviction under an ineffective assistance of
counsel theory where counsel "fail[ed] to move for a directed verdict after the State
failed to present evidence that Smith did not possess a valid concealed weapon
permit during its case in chief."
The Utah Court of Appeals, in the case of State v. Smith, 65 P.3d 648, 655
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) reversed the conviction of a defendant on ineffective assistance
of counsel claims where there was "no possible explanation or tactical reason" for
counsels failure to move to dismiss at the close of the state's case. In that case, the
Court held:
We conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise this lack of evidence as a basis
for dismissal of the charge is "so deficient as to fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness." (citations omitted)
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court
expanded the Strickland test in certain circumstances. The Court stated:
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It is true that while the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance for
resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, there
are situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental fairness
may affect the analysis.
In Williams v. Taylor, the Court reversed the defendant's death sentence on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the defense counsel did not investigate
the defendant's "nightmarish childhood", nor the fact that the defendant was
"borderline mentally retarded" (Id. at 395, 396) The Court concluded that defense
counsel unreasonably failed to begin mitigation investigation until one week prior to
trial, and then unreasonably failed to investigate numerous areas of mitigating
evidence that could have benefited the defendant in the penalty phase.
In the case of State v. Bennett 999 P.2d 1, 3, (Utah 2000) Justice Durham, in a
concurring opinion noted:
\ 13 This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has
been recognized in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d
439, 442 (Utah 1996) (noting, in ineffective assistance of counsel case,
that "pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, we
may presume prejudice in circumstances where it is unnecessary and
ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice"
In the present case, the Defendant claims that counsel was ineffective in one
instance during the trial. Specifically, during closing arguments the prosecutor made
several incorrect and highly significant statements regarding reasonable doubt that
are in direct contravention to statutory, constitutional, and case law. For some reason
defense counsel failed to object to the statements, which in effect implied his
acquiescence to the prosecutor's claim that the jury need not worry about reasonable
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doubt and deliberations. A more thorough discussion of this issue was presented in
Point III above.
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a jury given information that may need not worry about reasonable doubt establishes
a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different.
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in the
outcome of the trial.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this court
reverse the Defendant's conviction and, if reversed for grounds of insufficient
evidence, remand for dismissal, if reversed for grounds of Rule 403 and 404
violations or inadequate assistance of counsel, remand for a new trial.
DATED this / J d a y of November 2005.

JDALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Defendant
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDENi COU^f'[" '
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HAY 2 4 2005

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 041906257 FS

JOSEPH HOSKINS,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

JOHN R MORRIS
May 23, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
carier
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RYAN BUSHELL, PDA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 23, 1981
Video
Tape Number:
M052305
Tape Count: 1017
CHARGES
1. ROBBERY (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/09/2005 Guilty
2. SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/09/2005 Guilty
HEARING
This is time set for APP Sentencing. The defendant is present in
custody from the Utah State Prison with counsel. A presentence
investigation report has been submitted to the Court.
The defendant objects to the prison recommendation. Court proceeds
with sentencing.
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Case No: 041906257
Date:
May 23, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ROBBERY a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff
_:ie defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Each term is to run consecutive with one another and consecutive
any other sentence being served.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of SIMPLE ASSAULT a Class A
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The term of 365 days
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336 2 7 t h

Street.

Q

2 7th a i 1 K i e s s e 1 ,• i

A

Yes.

Q

And who was he living with?

A

Danielle Peterson.

Q

And did you have occasion to see him sometime after

I I: 1

f: i :i • ?

that ?
A

I did.

Q

Wl: lei l \
n August

10th and a g a i n

on A u g u s t

17th.

• w i I In I

on A u g u s t

10th?

" my office.
And what was the purpose of that visit?
For hi m, to check

. .s :or the m o n t h .

'-'•> whei I he checked "in, wh -: w.is the r e q u i r e m e n t
that you p i a c e a JI:

.e crieckec _:..

e's required to —

know if this is going to t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s
] :ather than character e v i d e n c e .
MR. DECARIA:

Yeah, I M 1 skip this, I think counsel

may be right and rather than worry about it, I'll just move
onto the date of the ] ; ' :i
THE COURT:
I '!! I

Thank you, Mr. Decaria.

C E 3ARI7 •

"I

; < i i.
3] 9

1
2

Q

(BY MR. DECARIA)

On August 17, 2004, you made

contact with the defendant again; is that correct?

3

A

That is correct.

4

Q

And where were you at the time?

5

A

In my office.

6

Q

And was there an appointment for him to come in?

7

A

I don't recall exactly what precipitated the visit.

8

Q

He did come in?

9

A

He did.

10

Q

And what was the purpose of that visit?

11

A

Again, probably to check in.

I'd probably asked

12

him to come in and on that day I requested a urinalysis from

13

him.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

I did.

16

Q

And did you witness the deposit of the urine?

17

A

I did.

18

MR. BUSHELL:

19

this.

20

of Ms. Peterson.

Your Honor, I'm going to object to

I don't think this has anything to do with impeachment

21
22

So did you take urine from him?

THE COURT:
Q

Overruled.

(BY MR. DECARIA)

And so then you witnessed the

23

defendant deposit the urine into the cup and then what did

24

you do with it?

25 |

A

Tested it.
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Q

TT

i

I ;ie have a th ree, four, five-panel slides and we

ow d.i d you test it?

dep osit d r o p s of urine onto the s u a e ,...::-_, , •.

give us a

positive or ne gative reading.
«

i: • • ]', E

1 i i i: ij ::: ;
::::
:::::i i

ni tl I • :::: 1 lei i deals jus
:::: rt :i::i grit: l !
::: :::: i I tl i :::: •

sli de?

a t that t i m e - o k a y , had you done this before?
/-i

i e£>.

Q

Not for t h i s defendant but for many other

def endan ts?
A

or re;..:,.
,nd have

you testified in court with regard to your

I Jo.
: : •

i

E 'irss.t t i m e .
Tell me

w h a t the result of the test was

MR. B U S H E L L :
THE C O U R T :
(B Y1 1 11

I object again.
Overruled.

DECARIA)

of the test ?
Wl lat v : L, 3 1:1:result
le

I :lr. H o s k i n s was positive
•

•

•

1

i,

••

ini1

• ' L I i: l e

for controlled substances.

tl I ::::
! :::: DI ltr ::::).] ] :::: :::i stances?
si lk

ocaine , methamphetamine, and THC.

321

1

A

Marijuana.

2

MR. DECARIA:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BUSHELL:

5

THE COURT:

6

Thank you very much, Mr. Tolman.

7
8

Okay.

I have no further questions.

Thank you Mr. Decaria.

Mr. Bushell?

I have no question of this witness.
Thank you, Mr. Bushell.
You may step

down.
MR. BUSHELL:

9

motion at this time.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. BUSHELL:

Your Honor, I would like to make a

Please do so.
Your Honor, I would move that the

12

entire testimony of Mr. Tolman be stricken in that it in not

13

way showed credibility towards the prior witness, Ms.

14

Peterson, in this matter.

15

of my client.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. .DECARIA:

It was only toward the character

Mr. Decaria?
Your Honor, I'd respond by saying

18

that her credibility as to her knowledge as to the

19

whereabouts and the activities of the defendant are in

20

question as soon as she testifies.

21

course, that she never saw the defendant use drugs, had no

22

knowledge of his using drugs and he was in her presence at

23

all times, almost at all times.

24

important and when you find out the defendant had drugs in

25

his system the day of the actual incident, it leads to

When she testified, of

Then that issue becomes
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1

N o w wi lat I say is not evidence.

2

is n o t e v i d e n c e .

3

Inn when this thing occurred.

4 j tria 1
l

)

6

What counsel says

N e i t h e r he n o r I w e r e at t h e O g d e n R i v e r
The defendant requested a jury

T1 Ia t: s i I• : • t: < E - idei ice ei 11: Ier 11 I< E fac 1: 11 i a 1: I: I• E • :i :eques ted

a jury trial.

It cuts neither for or against his guilt or
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7

h i m that right t o that jury t r i a l a n d i t ' s m y o b l i g a t i o n as

8

the prosecutor of this county to guarantee that he gets it

9

and gets it fairly and that's what m y intention has been

10

throughout this hearing.

11

The defendant is charged with two crimes.

He's

'.:. t h e same w a y that E] ] i s

12

charged with r o b b e r y , r o b b e r y

13

Ringwoo

14

c r i m e , n^ w o r s e , o n e that c a r r i e s n o m o r e p u n i s h m e n t , o n e

15

that

16

c h a r g e d , h o w e v e r , w i t h t h e c h a r g e of a s s a u l t b e c a u s e as

17

you've heard the testimony, h e ' s the one that struck this

18

little m a n .

19

\~

-inosha JacKi;.;.
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c 1 SO

I want to talk about some of the things that you're

20

suppose to i ise a ,.s a g uide for yoi ir deliberations toda;\,

21

is, reasonable doubt.

22

r e a s o na b ] e d o i ik t

23

3 0 . Sometimes you hear - it's used in the legal context

24

sometimes and it bothers m e when this :i s done,

0ne

The judge has instructed you on

TI: I e r e a s o n a b ] e d o i i b 1: :i s 11 i s t r i i • :: t :i c • i I I J ::

Peop] e say I

25 ( know it's true beyond a shadow of a doubt or there's even a
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